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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
LA '""ERE KIDMAN, et ux.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents~
vs.
LA 'TINE H. WHITE, et al.,
Defendants and Appellant~

Case No.

KEITH S. JONES,
Third Party Plaintiff~
vs.
WILLIAM E. WADE et ux., et al.,
Third Party Defendants.

9704

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action on a contract and a cross-claim
on a similar contract by the third party beneficiaries
to effect collection of two notes that are claimed to be
incorporated by reference into the contracts and are
now in default. Both contracts were entered into by
Lavine H. White and ''Tilliam E. Wade and Erma M.

''r ade.
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
At pre-trial in the District Court of Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Ray 'ran Cott, Jr., construed
the two agreements to incorporate the two notes and
entered Summary Judgment in favor of the Kidmans
and against Lavine H. White and against Keith S.
Jones and the Wades, vvho admitted liability on the one
note. This Summary Judgment was in the amount of
$4,568.07, together with interest at the rate of six per
cent per annum from ~larch 4, I960, to May I, I962,
and at eight per cent thereafter until paid, and attorney's fees in the amount of $7I4.68. The Court also
entered Summary Judgment in favor of Keith S. Jones
and against Lavine H. ''Thite and against the
ades,
who admitted liability on the other note. This Summary
Judgment was in the amount of $550.00, together with
interest at the rate of six per cent per annum from
March I, I960, to lVIay I, I962, and reasonable attorney's fees in the amount of $195.00, and reimbursement
for any amounts Keith S. Jones is required to pay on
the Summray Judgment granted the Kidmans.

''r

Lavine H. White is now appealing from these two
Summary Judgments.

CONTENTION OF RESPONDENTS
Respondents contend that the District Court correctly construed the agreetnent of LaYine H. White
to mean that she asstuned the obligation of the
ades

''r
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on the Conditional Sales Note to Kidmans and the
obligation on the Promissory Note to Jones, and
properly determined that she had no defense which had
any merit or upon which reasonable men could differ.
Therefore, the Summary Judgments should be affirmed.

STATEMEN'f OF FACTS
In appellant's Statement of Facts an assignment
from Keith Jones to 'Villiam E. Wade and Erma M.
ade has been quoted at length, but has no bearing on
the issue raised on this appeal. Also appellant has left
out of her Statement of Facts items that do have a
bearing on the issue in question. Therefore, respondents
set forth the Statement of Facts as follows:

''r

Keith Jones, in order to start a Drive-In business
located at 3325 South 23rd East, Salt Lake City, Utah,
purchased some equipment from LaVere Kidman and
Leah 0. Kidman, giving as security for the payment
thereof a Conditional Sales Note, dated July 21, 1957,
in the amount of $6,500.00, to be paid at the rate of
$100.00 a month, with interest at six per cent, and
providing that in the case of default the total amount
still outstanding would become immediately due, and
for attorney's fees if suit was necessary to effect collection of the note. ( R. 4-6) .
Keith Jones made all payments as they came due
(R. 31) until the principal had been reduced to
$5,408.72. (R. 8).
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On March 31, 1959, William F. Wade and Erma
M. Wade purchased the Drive-In business from Keith
S. Jones, giving as part of the consideration therefor
their agreement to assume and perform Keith S. Jones'
obligations on the said Conditional Sales Note (R. 79}, and also gave to Keith S. Jones their Promissory
Note in the amount of $641.28, which provided for
payment of $25.00 or more a month, with interest at
the rate of six per cent, and in case of default provided
for attorney's fees and acceleration of due date on outstanding principal. (R. 8, 16).
William F. Wade and Erma M. Wade kept up
the payments on the Conditional Sales Note (R. 31)
until the principal amount was paid down to $4,568.07
( R. 30), and kept up the payments on the Promissory
Note to Jones (R. 31) until the principal on it was paid
down to $550.00. ( R. 19) .
On February 4, 1961, Lavine H. White took over
the business from the ades and as consideration therefor entered into two agreements with the
ades. One
agreement was to assume and pay off in full the Wade
obligation on the said Conditional Sales Note owing to
the Kidmans (R. 10) and the other agreement was to
assume and pay off the
ade obligation on the Promissory Note owing to Keith S. Jones. (R. 19).

''T

''T

''T

Lavine H. 'Vhite defaulted on both notes. (R. 31).
In order to effect collection of the Conditional Sales
Note the J{idmans brought this action against White,
Jones and the ''rades. (R. 1-10). In order for Jones to

4
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protect his interests and to effect collection of the
J>romissory Note of \Vades to him, he brought a crossclaim against \ \Thite and the \ \T ades. ( R. 15-19) .
'fhe District l~ourt in a pre-trial hearing construed
the t\\·o agreements of Lavine H. \Vhite to mean that
she had assumed the\ \T ades' obligation on the two notes,
including the penalties in the event she defaulted, and
determined that she had no meritoriousc, defensJt to the
aetion commenced to effect collection of the notes. The
Court granted a Motion for Summary J udgment,
holding all defendants liable to the l(idmans for the
amount still owing on the Conditional Sales Note, together with interest and attorney's fees. The Court
also granted Jones' motion for Summary Judgment,
holding ''rhite and the Wades liable for the amount still
o\ving on the Promissory Note, together with interest
and attorney's fees. (R. 25-26).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY
INTERPRETED 'THE T\,rO AGREEMENTS
OF LA VINE H. ''rHITE \VITH WILLIAM E.
ADE AND ER~IA l\tl. "WADE.

''r

It appears to be Lavi11e H. White's contention
that the two agreements hereinafter set forth in full
merely obligated her to pay $4,568.07 at $100.00 per
month, and $550.00 at $25.00 per month, whereas, it
5
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was the judgment of the lower court and respondent's
contention that she assumed the Wade obligations,
which included the penalties provided in those obligations in the event she defaulted. The only part of the
lower court's judgment that is being questioned is
whether or not Lavine H. White is subject to the provision of acceleration, interest and attorney's fees
provided in each of the two obligations she assumed.
A. B 0 T H AGREEMENTS CLEARLY
PROVIDE THAT LAVINE H. WHITE
AGREED TO ASSUME THE WADES'
OBLIGATION IN FULL AND NOT
MERELY TO PAY A CERTAIN
AMOUN'l, OF MONEY.
The agreement with reference to the Conditional
Sales Note owing to the Kidmans reads as follows:
''In consideration of the trans£er of all right,
title and interest of ''TILLIAM E. 'VADE
and ERMA M. 'VADE, his wife, in and to all
personal property, located at 3325 South 2300
East, Salt Lake County, Utah, I hereby agree
to assume and pay off in full the obligation of
William E.
ade and Erma l\1.
ade, to
Woodbury Corporation (Mr. La\rere Kidman)
in the amount of $4,568.07 at the rate of $100
per month. Is/ Lavine H. White." (R. 10}.

''r

'T

The agreement 'vith reference to the Promissory
Note owing to Jones reads as follows:
"In consideration of the trans£er of all right,
title and interest of ''TILLIAl\I E. 'VADE
6
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''r

and ER:\1..:\ :\I.
ADE, his 'vife, in and to all
personal property located at 3325 South 2300
East, Salt Lake County, Utah, I hereby agree
to assume and pay off in full the obligation of
'Villiam E. ''rade and Erma l\1. Wade, to Mr.
Keith S. Jones, in the amount of $550.00 at the
rate of $25 per month.
/s/ Lavine H. vVhite." (R. 19).
In both of the agreements it is clear and unambiguous that Lavine H. White agreed to assume the Wade
obligation. The a1nounts referred to in each agreement
clearly indicate an attempt to give some identification
of the obligation and was not an attempt to describe
all of the terms of the obligation assumed.
As a matter of grammatical construction, Lavine
H. White agreed to assume and pay off in full the
obligation of the Wades and not as appellant contends,
that she agreed only to pay the amounts specified. If
the agreements were only to pay certain amounts and
not assume the obligation, the parties would have so
indicated by appropriate language-for instance, "I
agree to assume and pay the amount of ... " But when
Lavine H. White agreed to assume and pay off in
full the obligation, she 'vas obligated to do so, and was
required to perform the obligation in accordance with
the terms of the obligation, which not only require her
to pay the outstanding amounts at the amounts per
month specified, but also subjected her to the penalties
provided in the obligation in the event she defaulted.
She is the one 'vho defaulted and it was entirely her
7
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own doings that brought the default provisions of both
notes into play.
It should be further noted that the parties used
the word "and" between the word "assume" and the
words "pay off," making it clear that Lavine H. White
did not merely assume to pay off the amounts referred
to, as contended by appellant, but agreed to assume
and pay off in full the obligation.
The amounts stated in each agreement stated the
amounts understood by the parties to be presently
owing on each obligation, and were not intended as a
statement of the complete obligation assumed. Appellant, by her strained interpretation of the agreements,
claims that she is not even liable for the interest on the
two notes. It is contrary to all common business sense
to contend that th eWades would give Lavine H. White
possession of the property and have her pay only the
principal on the property, and leave themselves obligated to keep up the monthly interest payments. Both
the terms of the agreement and common sense make
it clear that Lavine H. White assumed the full obligations of the 'Vades with reference to the property
of which she took possession.
B. BOTH AGREEMENTS CLEARLY REFERRED TO ANOTHER INSTRUMENT. 'l~HEREFORE, THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT AND THE INSTRUMENT REFERRED TO MUST

8
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BE CONSIDERED AND CONSTRUED
AS ONE.
The doctrine of Incorporation by Reference has
been applied frequently 'vhen the courts have been
called on to interpret a "\vritten instrument, and the two
agreements the Court is now being called upon to construe require this rule of construction to be applied.
Both of the agreements of Lavine H. White clearly
make reference to other instruments, and the rules of
construction require that "effect must be given to writings incorporated in to the con tract by reference . . . ''
Oberg v. City of I~os Angeles~ 132 C. App. (2nd) 151,
281 Pac. (2d) 591, 596 ( 1955).
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently stated
this to be a proper rule of construction. In Miller v.
Hancock~ 67 U. 202, 246 Pac. 949, 953, and in Mathis
v. Madsen~ 1 U. (2nd) 46, 261 Pac. (2d) 952, 956, the
Court stated:
"Respondent cites cases to the effect that separate writings may be construed together as containing all the terms of a contract, though only
one be signed by the party to be charged; (citing cases) . The doctrine of these cases is wellnigh elementary. It is at least supported by the
great weight of judicial opinion."
This rule of construction has been stated in Bell
v. Rio Grande Oil Co.~ 23 C. App. 2d 436, 73 Pac. (2d)
662, 663 ( 1938), as follows:
"A written agreement may, by reference expressly made thereto, incorporate other written

9
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

agreements; and in the event such incorporation
is made, the original agreement and those referred to must be considered and construed as
one." (Citing cases) .
Other cases stating the same rule: Cerino v. Oregon
Physicians Service_, 202 Ore. 474, 276 Pac. (2d) 397,
401; Holbrook v. Fazio_, 84 C. App. (2d) 700, 191
Pac. ( 2d) 26, 123.
The Arizona Supreme Court in f!limate Control_, Inc.
v. Hill_, 86 Ariz. 180, 342 Pac. (2d) 854, 859, has made
it clear that the agreement need not specifically state
the other instrument to be incorporated in the agreement before the rule of incorporation by reference is
applied, but mere reference to it is sufficient:
" . . . it has long been settled, without a dissenting voice, that parties may incorporate into
agreements by mere reference, other 'Yritings or
agreements or records, and thereby make the
latter an essential part of the contract."
The Arizona Supreme Court made it clear in the
same case that merely because a meaning can be given
to a clause without considering the instrument referred
to does not prevent the court as a matter of la'Y from
construing the instrument referred to "Tith the signed
agreement:

"A judicial interpretation of a contract does
not reach a point "There the meaning of so1ne
clause can be said to be in doubt upon merely
arriving at a conclusion that such clause may, as
an abstract proposition~ be giYen either of t'Yo
meanings. A clause in a contract~ if taken by
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itself, often adtnits of two meaning, when from
the 'vhole contract there is no reasonable doubt
as to the sense in which the parties use it."
So it is with the interpretation of the two agreements of Lavine II. "rhite. It is possible to give a
strained interpretation of what obligation was being
assumed if the last part of the agreement is read separately, but 'vhen the complete agreement is read it
becomes clear that Lavine H. White was purchasing
personal property and as consideration for that property was assuming the obligations theW ades had undertaken with reference to the property.
Lavine H. White was not merely purchasing personal property and paying so much money for it, but
rather she was buying personal property being used in
a going business by taking possession of the property
and assuming the obligations which went with possession
and use of the property. Lavine H. White well knew
the obligations that went with this personal property
was a Conditional Sales Note O\ving to Kidmans and
a Promissory Note owing to Jones, and she was not
ignorant, nor has she at any time in these proceedings
claimed to be ignorant of the contents of these two
notes.

POINT II
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT CONSIDER PAROL E ,~IDE N C E BUT CON11
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STRUED THE AGREEMENTS AS A MATTER OF LAW.
The appellant under Point II of her brief contends that "the only logical way that the lower court
could have reached its decision to include attorney's
fees, an acceleration clause and interest in this contract
was to admit parol evidence to further define the word
"obligation." This inference and contention have no
basis, but on the contrary the record clearly indicates
that parol evidence was not considered.
The pre-trial order clearly states the basis for the
court's opinion. With reference to the obligation owed
by Wades to Kidman, the Court stated:
"Eugene Hansen, counsel for Mrs. 'Vhite,
claimed defendant was not liable under said
conditional sales note but the Court after reviewing Exhibit (} of the amended coomplaint ruled
as a matter of law that said defendant was bound
by terms of said conditional sales note." (R. 25).
Exhibit C is Lavine H. White's agreement to
assume and pay off 'Vades' obligation to Kidman. (R.
10).

It is obvious from this statement by the Court in
the pre-trial order that the Court applied the "incorporation by reference'' rule of construction and did not
consider parol evidence. The Court's statement clearly
states that "after revie,ving Exhibit C," meaning that
it construed the contract as it was "~ritten. The Court
states that after reYiewing Exhibit C it ruled as a matter

12
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of ht\V that Lavine H. ''rhite was bound by terms of
said conditional sales note. In other words, Lavine H.
\\'bite's agreement, as shown by Exhibit C, referred
to the (\nalitional Sale Note in such a way that the
terms of the Conditional Sale Note were incorporated
hy reference into the agreement.
\\rith reference to the Promissory Note owing to
Jones, the l'1ourt stated in the pre-trial order the followIng:

''Respecting the claim of Keith S. Jones vs.
Lavine H. 'Vhite, wherein plaintiff seeks to recover the sum of $550.00 and attorney's fees in
the amount of $195.00, together with interest
thereon at the rate of 6ro per annum from March
1, 1960, the Court held that she has no meritorious defense to this claim. Therefore judgment
is entered for said amount." (R. 26).
This order by the District Court makes it clear
that not only were the terms of the Promissory Note
incorporated by reference into the agreement, but the
Court determined as a matter of law that White has
no meritorious defense to this claim. According to the
decision of the Seventh Circuit Court in Whiti-ng
Stoker Co. v. Chicago Stoker Corporation~ 171 Fed.
(2d) 2~8, 251 (1949), this was a determination which
the Court may properly make.
"A possibility of doubt is not sufficient, for it
is out of such possibilities that controversies arise.
It is the duty of the court to ascertain by judicial
interpretation, not whether a doubt may be asserted, but 'vhether any ambiguity really exists."
(Citing cases).
13
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As stated by appellantj on Page 8 of her brief,
quoting from Moore's Federal Practice, Section 56:15:
"The function of a summary judgment is to
avoid a useless trial . . . In ruling on a motion
for a summary judgment the court's function
is to determine whether such a genuine issue
exists, not to resolve any existing factual issues."
The pre-trial order clearly shows that the District
Court determined that a trial would be useless because
the contract was not ambiguous so as to require parole
evidence, and that Lavine H. White had no meritorious
defense to present at a trial.
There is no indication in either the pre-trial order
granting summary judgment or any other place in
the record that any parole evidence was considered by
the Court in construing the agreements of Lavine H.
White.

POINT III
SUMMARY JUDG~IENT WAS PROPER
BECAUSE THE AGREEl\IENTS 'VERE NOT
AMBIGUOUS SO AS TO REQUIRE PAROLE
EVIDENCE TO INTERPRET THEM AND
LEVINE H. ''rHI'fE HAS NO l\IERITORIOUS
DEFENSE.
Merely because more than one interpretation can
be claimed of an agreement is not sufficient to require
the Court to proceed 'vith trial and hear parole evidence
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before eonstruing the agreement. "The question of
\rhether an ambiguity exists is to be determined by
the court as a question of la,v." 17 CJS 1287 .
.t\.ccording to the holding in Whiting Stoker Co.
v. Chicago Stoker (yorporation., 171 Fed. (2d) 248, 251
( 1949) :
"'A contract is ambiguous if~ and only if, it is
reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions; it is not ambiguous if the court can
determine its meaning without any guide other
than a kno\\·ledge of the simple facts on which,
from the nature of language in general, its meaning depends. 17 C.J .S., Contracts, Sec. 294, and
cases there cited. Contracts are not rendered
a1nbiguous by the 1nere fact that the parties do
not agree upon their proper construction. (Citing cases) . . . . A possibility of doubt is not
sufficient, for it is out of such possibilities that
controversies arise. It is the duty of the court to
ascertain by judicial interpretation, not whether
a doubt may be asserted, but whether any ambiguity really exists." (Citing cases) .

The District Court has assumed its proper responsibility in this case and determined whether or not any
ambiguity exists in the two agreements. The Court has
also assumed its proper responsibility in determining
whether or not a 1neritorious defense exists and has
determined that none exists.
There is no ambiguity In the language of these
t"·o agreements. The language is absolutely clear that
Lavine H. ''Thite assumed the obligations the Wades
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owed to Kidmans and to Jones. The Wades had only
one obligation to the Kidmans and only one obligation
to Jones, and it is these two obligations that the District
Court has ordered Lavine H. White responsible for.
The law as stated in Terrill v. Laney~ 200 Okla.
308, 193 Pac. ( 2d) 296, 300 ( 1948) , makes it clear that
there are no grounds for a trial in this case.
"The language used in a contract is to govern
its interpretation and, if such language is clearly
explicit and does not involve uncertainty, the
words used are to be understood in their ordinary
and proper sense, and, when the language is plain
and unambiguous, extrinsic evidence as to its
meaning is not admissible. In such situation, the
construction of the contract is for the court and
not the jury."

CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that the District
Court has correctly assumed its responsibility of determining whether or not the two agreements of Lavine
H. White were ambiguous. Further, the Court has
properly determined that no ambiguity exists and has
applied correct rules of construction in making an interpretation of the agreements, giving the proper Swnmary Judgment against Lavine H. ''rhite in conform-.
ance with the plain meaning of the two agreements.

16
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Therefore the District l"ourt's Summary Judgments
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
~IcKAY

r\ND BURTON
BARRIE G. McKAY
Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent

THOMASVUYK
53 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
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